Here’s Episode 13, which is part 2 of my coverage of Plantinga and presuppositional apologetics.
In this episode I present Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. I then close by summing up the similarity between Plantinga and Van Til and co., and respond to one objection that is common to them both.
Also, for the first time ever – we have mail! I reply to it at the end of this episode.
Here’s Episode 12: “Plantinga and Presuppositional Apologetics.” I’ve decided to give Plantinga two episodes, as it ended up filling up a big chunk of time. This is part 1, which looks at Plantinga’s argument for theism from Warrant.
This episode is an explanation of “presuppositional apologetics,” one of several approaches to defending the Christian faith.
Episode 12 will be about the anti-naturalistic arguments of Alvin Plantinga, and I will argue there that Plantinga and not Van Til should be the one to whom presuppositionalists look.
Every now and then I tip my hat in the direction of Cornelius Van Til – But he was wrong in a few ways, and I’d hate for anyone to think that I’m one of those dyed-in-the-wool Van Til fans who think he could do no wrong. He did much wrong (and much good), philosophically speaking. So here’s one way in which he was wrong: Van Til’s position committed to epistemic internalism, which is an indefensible view of epistemology.
Anyone familiar with Van Til’s apologetic, whether expressed by Van Til or his followers, like Greg L. Bahnsen, will recognise the Van Tillian quality of the argument:
Laws of logic, science and morality require the existence of God.
So called Atheists employ laws of logic, science and morality.
So-called atheists show that they really do know that God exists (purportedly from 1. and 2.).
Just now I’m not denying either premise, and I’m not denying the conclusion either. But the above argument is formally invalid, and it might only appear valid if one assumes epistemic internalism. Continue reading “(one of the ways in which) Van Til was wrong”→