It’s an unfortunate fact that New Zealand lacks a strong cultural niche that recognises and promotes theologically conservative Christian scholarship of excellence in the humanities, specifically philosophy and theology, apologetics and biblical studies that interacts with some of the radical scholarship of recent decades? The choice here seems to be between denominational/theological partisanship that paints itself into the corner of irrelevance on one hand and liberalism where scandal and smugness is more important than truth on the other.
Are there people out there in this small pond who aren’t like that? Yes. But is there anything out there to encourage them? Is there anything to aim for? Are there parachurch organisations with this sort of scholarly orientation to aspire to be involved with, as there are in other countries? Not at all, as far as I can tell. Do we have colleges of higher learning with this sort of emphasis? Well we have Christian colleges of higher learning, but none who seem to taking any steps in this direction (one of them has made some muted murmurs about future possibilities, but that is as far as it goes). Are there networks through which Christian scholars can connect to others in their position? Not really, no. Do secular universities look kindly on those qualified people with primary interests in these areas? Well, there aren’t many Universities in New Zealand anyway, but the answer is still no. Were I a vocal sceptic I would have better chances – sad but true. Does your own church have enthusiasm for the unique contribution someone in this position can offer in its teaching programmes? Not in my experience.
There’s a difference between being educated and being indoctrinated.
I recently installed a new “Most Popular Posts” widget in the sidebar. It measures popularity by pageviews, not by the number of comments. The trouble is, it only started measuring a few days ago when I installed it, so the posts currently showing as the most popular are really only the most popular posts iver the last few days – namely the newest posts. However, in my WordPress control panel – the one you can’t see – it lists the posts that got the most attention over the last year. The most visited post was my anouncement that William Lane Craig had debated Christopher Hitchens and that the mp3 was available online – only to have to later point out that it was not going to be online after all due to copyright issues. After that one, here are the posts that were visited the most:
As I mentioned recently, while I’ll still comment on any issues that grab my attention, I’m turning my blogging attention more towards areas that will be related to the book project on the moral argument for theism (although the podcast will remain as diverse as ever). I’m trying to arrange my reading and academic-time-investment around that project as well. It’s easy to get distracted with such eclectic interests in theology and philosophy and I already have an attention span like a goldfish!
Like many brilliant minds, Nicholas Wolterstorff goes awry in his criticism of divine command ethics.

Recently I posted a blog entry on the difference between ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism (explaining that the former of which is not the same thing as metaphysical naturalism). I also indicated there that not everyone shares the same understanding of what “naturalism” really refers to, and I explained what I think. In brief, I think the most helpful way to distinguish between ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism is as follows: In non-naturalism, moral “goodness” is a basic quality, not constituted by anything other than itself, not defined in terms of any non-moral facts, and not caused by any descriptive state of affairs. If any of these conditions (or anything relevantly like them) are met, then the view in question is a species of ethical naturalism. Yet another way of putting this is to say that ethical non-naturalism affirms the existence of sui generis, irreducible, brute moral facts. Stated differently yet again, according to ethical naturalism, the true claim “X is morally wrong” has a truthmaking set of true statements that do not use moral terms like “wrong” or “right.”